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Abstract:  The sudden appearance of consciousness that Reber posits in creatures with 
flexible cell walls and motility rather than non-flexible cells walls and no motility involves an 
evolutionary discontinuity. This kind of “miracle” is required by all “discontinuity” theories of 
consciousness. To avoid miraculous emergence, one may need to consider continuity 
theories, which accept that different forms of consciousness and material functioning co-
evolve but assume the existence of consciousness to be primal in the way that matter and 
energy are assumed to be primal in physics. 
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Where should one draw the line between entities that are conscious and those that are not?  
In my various surveys of research on this question (Velmans, 2000, ch. 12; 2007; 2009, ch. 
14; 2011, 2012), I conclude that theories about the distribution of consciousness divide into 
continuity and discontinuity theories. Continuity theorists suggest that there is no arbitrary 
line in the descent from macroscopic to microscopic matter at which consciousness suddenly 
appears out of nothing. Rather, elementary forms of matter may be associated with 
elementary forms of experience. And if they encode information, they may be associated 
with rudimentary forms of mind. Discontinuity theories all claim that consciousness emerged 
at a particular point in the evolution of the universe. They merely disagree about which 
point. Consequently, discontinuity theories all face the same problem. What switched the 
lights on? What is it about matter, at a particular stage of evolution, that suddenly gave it 
consciousness? Nearly all try to define the point of transition in functional terms, although 
they disagree about the nature of the critical function. Some think consciousness “switched 
on” only in humans, for example, once they acquired language or a theory of mind. Some 
believe that consciousness emerged once brains reached a critical size or complexity. Others 
believe it co-emerged with the ability to learn, to move, or to respond in some other 
adaptive way to the environment.  
 
Given the unquestionable presence of consciousness in humans and its likely presence in 
many other animals, it is entirely reasonable for Reber (2016) to search for the origins of 
consciousness in early forms of organic life and to link the evolution of consciousness to the 
evolution of those organisms. As he asserts in the Axiom on which his Cellular Basis of 
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Consciousness (CBC) thesis depends: “Mind and consciousness are not unique features of 
human brains. They are grounded in inherent features present in simpler forms in virtually 
every species. Any organism with flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its surrounds and the 
capacity for locomotion will possess the biological foundations of mind and consciousness” 
(p. 4).  
 
Note that although Reber’s analysis of the distribution of consciousness is far more inclusive 
than most, it is still a discontinuity theory that separates organisms that possess a form of 
consciousness from those that don’t, placing the boundary between single cells that are 
responsive to their environment and have a capacity for locomotion and those that don’t. 
For example, he excludes “plants and fungi on the grounds that they have rigid cell walls 
composed of cellulose, hemicellulose and pectin (plants) or chitin (fungi), and lack the 
capacity for endogenous locomotion” (p. 4, note 4).  
 
One could of course point out that some plants are responsive to their environment and 
have the ability to move. For example, the leaflets of the Mimosa plant habituate to 
repeated stimulation — i.e., the leaflets rapidly close when first touched — but after 
repeated stimulation they re-open fully and do not close again while the stimulus remains 
the same. Surprisingly, this habituation is stimulus-specific. For example, Holmes & Yost 
(1966) induced leaflet closure using either water droplets or brush strokes, and after 
repeated stimulation (with either stimulus) habituation occurred. But if the stimulus was 
changed (from water drops to brush strokes or vice-versa), leaflet closure re-occurred (see 
also Applewhite, 1975, for a review).  
 
Whether or not one might wish to include some plants, these demarcation criteria still 
present a mystery: why should having flexible cell walls and endogenous motility provide a 
clear separation between it being “like something to be something” and being like nothing at 
all? In principle, for example, it might be like something to have inflexible cell walls and little 
movement. Or to express the mystery the other way around, what is it about having flexible 
cell walls or endogenous motility that suddenly switches on consciousness?  
 
Reber admits to the problem. In his critique of the many theories that about brain-based 
consciousness he points out that they: 
 
 “… all suffer a fatal flaw: they require a miracle. They all need to specify the properties of 
complex neural states that give rise to conscious states; they have to identify the neural or 
computational properties that permit a brain to make a mind. And worse, they need to 
explicate why, when a neurological system crosses some threshold of complexity or hits upon 
the right set of interconnecting neural centers and pathways, it suddenly ‘makes 
consciousness.’ … Admittedly, the CBC also calls for a miracle, but it's a very small one and far 
more tractable than the ones that current neuroscientists and philosophers of mind have put 
on the table for us.” (p. 7) 
 
But miracles that take place in little cells are still miracles! In my view, Reber’s assertion that 
these are far more tractable than miracles in big brains, along with his subsequent 
argument, confound the conditions for the existence of consciousness (of any kind) with the 
added conditions required to determine the many forms it can take (Velmans, 2012). Why 
does Reber’s “small miracle” of cellular consciousness and his subsequent analysis of its 
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evolution seem to make the existence of human consciousness more tractable? Because 
once one assumes the existence of consciousness (in a single cell) — together with an as yet 
undiscovered but entirely plausible relationship between different forms of mental 
functioning and the forms of phenomenal consciousness that accompany them — one can 
give an entirely functional account of how adaptive mental functions and their 
accompanying experiences co-evolve (Velmans, 2012). Who can doubt that verbal thoughts 
require language, or that full human self-consciousness requires a theory of mind? Without 
internal representations of the world, how could consciousness be of anything? And without 
motility and the ability to approach or avoid, what point would there be to rudimentary 
pleasure or pain? However, none of these theories explains what it is about such biological 
functions that suddenly switches on consciousness (Velmans, 2011) 
 
There is much more to be said about these fundamental problems and how one might 
resolve them. Commentary length restrictions in Animal Sentience do not allow elaborating 
them here. A fuller version of this commentary, with a more elaborate analysis of Reber’s 
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